48. I am not arguing the point at the moment; I am only trying to get at the fact. If you have not looked for it, of course I cannot have it; but is there, so far as you know, any precedent of such a thing ever having happened? – I know of none; but I have not searched for any such precedent.

49. Mr. Attorney General: It would not appear, would it? – I hardly know how it would appear; unless one’s attention were specifically drawn to any case, there would be no means of discovering it.

50. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): I will ask whether that question was not raised in the case of Wilkes, and whether it was not in the consideration of that case fully discussed, and whether the House did not resolve that any such dealing with a member was subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom? – I do not understand how that case has any bearing upon the present question.

51. There are three cases: one of expulsion, two of election annulled, and then ultimate reversal of the whole of that and expungment by the House? – Yes, but that has no bearing upon the present case. Of course, I am familiar with the case of Wilkes, but not in connection with any matter arising out of the administration of oaths, which is the special matter referred to this Committee.

52. Have you had your attention called to the Journal of the House of Commons, Vol. I., page 460, in which Sir Francis Bacon, the King’s Attorney General, having sworn to his qualification, which was challenged, the House said, “Their oath, their own consciences to look into, not we to examine it?” – That case is not one of the precedents that we have collected.

Mr. Bradlaugh: They are entered extremely curiously, and one can only take the decision. It begins on page 459, “Eligibility of the Attorney General,” and it does not show there that it is Sir Francis Bacon: but I have learnt that by looking up the other records; and there being then a statutory declaration which lasted until a few years ago for all counsel, solicitors, and practising men of the law, it was objected that the King’s Attorney General could not sit; it appears that he had to swear to his qualification, and the question of his oath and of his disqualification, being Attorney General, were put, and the House said, “Their oath, their own consciences to look into, not we to examine it,” and they left him in the House, resolving that no future Attorney General should sit in it.

Chairman: That was the case which was raised as to whether the law officers of the Crown, who had for certain purposes seats in the House of Lords, had seats in the House of Commons.

Mr. Bradlaugh: Not quite that. There was an obsolete statute of the 46th Edward III., which was only repealed eight or nine years ago, but which does not seem to have been attended to, by which all practising barristers and solicitors were disqualified for sitting for counties.

53. Mr. Beresford Hope: Wilkes’s precedent being expunged, is it still legible in the Journal, and could it be produced for historical information? – Certainly.

54. Major Nolan: With regard to the evidence about O’Connell, I think you stated that an Act was passed to enable O’Connell and his co-religionists to sit in Parliament? – Not to enable O’Connell to sit in Parliament, but to enable Roman Catholics to sit in Parliament.

55. O’Connell was not allowed to take advantage of that Act until he was re-elected? – No, because he had been elected prior to the passing of the Act, and the Act was clearly prospective.

56. Was the wording of that particular statute the reason why he was not allowed to take advantage of that Act? – Certainly; distinctly.

57. Would it be possible for the present or any future Parliament to pass an Act which would enable a man who had been elected previous to the passing of the Act to sit in the House? – It is not for me to say what Act of Parliament might be agreed to by Parliament, but that is quite a distinct case. In that case Mr. O’Connell had actually been elected when the Catholic Relief Act was passed, and there was a clause in the Act which made its operation prospective, and therefore distinctly, and, I believe, intentionally, excluding Mr. O’Connell from the benefits of the Act.

58. Then he was only prevented from taking advantage of that Act owing to the particular wording of that particular clause, and not owing to anything inherent in the House of Commons? – Yes; the decision was founded upon a literal construction of the words of the recent statute.

59. Mr. Whitbread: The case of Mr. O’Connell was this: that he declined to take the oath which was required of Members of Parliament elected at the time that he was elected, and that he requested to be allowed to take another form of oath; he was ordered to withdraw, and the House considered his case; is there anything that you have found in the Journals or in the Debates to indicate that if Mr. O’Connell had been willing to take the oath required of him by the House, the House would have objected to his so taking it? – Certainly not; they put it to him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, and upon the face of the Journal, it would seem that if he had taken that oath, he would have been admitted.

60. Mr. Bradlaugh (through the Committee): After John Archdale had claimed to affirm, did not the House absolutely order him to attend in his place for the purpose of being sworn, and tender the oaths to him? – Mr. Archdale was ordered to attend, and the House being informed that Mr. Archdale attended according to order, his letter to Mr. Speaker was read. That letter is printed at full length among the precedents. “And the several statutes qualifying persons to come into and sit and vote in this House were read, viz., of the 3 °Car. II., 1 Will. and Mariæ, and 7 & 8 Will. and Mariæ. And then the said Mr. Archdale was called in, and he came into the middle of the House, almost to the table; and Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House, asked him whether he had taken the oaths, or would take the oaths, appointed to qualify himself to be a Member of this House; to which he answered, That in regard to a principle of his religion he had not taken the oaths, nor could take them; and then he withdrew, and a new writ was ordered.”

61. Mr. Serjeant Simon: With reference to what the Honorable Member for Bedford has put to you just now, Mr. O’Connell refused to take the Oath of Supremacy on the ground that it contained matter which he knew to be untrue, and other matter which he believed to be untrue? – Yes, he so stated.

62. Thereupon he withdrew; but is there any precedent among the Journals to show that a Member stating beforehand that what was contained in the oath was untrue, or a matter of unbelief to him, has been allowed to take the oath under such circumstances? – No, this is the only precedent, so far as I know, of that particular character. The others are cases of absolute refusal to take the oath, or a desire to make an affirmation instead of an oath, or to leave out certain words of the Oath.

63. But is there any precedent where, as in the case of Mr. O’Connell, a Member coming to the table of the House, has made a statement such as Mr. O’Connell made, that the oath contains matter which he knows to be untrue, or believes to be untrue, and has been allowed to take the oath afterwards? – There is no case to be found, so far as I know; certainly there is none in any of these precedents.

64. Mr. Secretary Childers: Is the precedent in Mr. O’Connell’s case this; that on the 15th May Mr. O’Connell said that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy, and that, nevertheless, on the 19th, he was asked whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, although he had previously informed the House that he was unable to take it? – Yes, because he had been heard, in the interval, upon his claim to take the new oath, under the recent Catholic Relief Act.

65. But was not that a precedent for a Member who had already stated that he could not take a certain oath, nevertheless being afterwards asked by the House whether he would take it? – It so appears on the face of the precedents.

66. I will put that question again more clearly; is it not the case that, as appears on page 5 of the Paper which you have placed before us, Mr. O’Connell on the 15th May said, that he could not take the Oath of Supremacy? – Yes.

67. And that, nevertheless, on the 19th of May it was ordered that Mr. Speaker do communicate to him the Resolution passed on the same day, and ask him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy? – It was so.

68. Although the House was aware that Mr. O’Connell had said that he could not take it? – Yes; but as I observed before, in the interval he had been heard upon the question of his right to take the new oath; and that, I think, accounts for the fact that the question was repeated to him as to whether, after the decision of the House had been communicated, he still persisted in refusing to take the Oath of Supremacy.

69. Mr. Watkin Williams: Was not Mr. O’Connell’s objection to taking the Oath of Supremacy an objection to the truth of the matter sworn to? – Yes, certainly; and it was an oath which no Roman Catholic could take.

70. It was the truth of the matter which he was asked to pledge his oath to that he objected to, and he did not express any disbelief in the binding character of the oath itself? – No. Every Roman Catholic objected to take the Oath of Supremacy; in fact, the Oath of Supremacy was expressly designed to exclude them from Parliament.

71. Mr. Attorney General: And in consequence of the objection a new form of oath was put in the Catholic Relief Bill? – Certainly, because the Oath of Supremacy was intended to exclude Roman Catholics, and did exclude them, and was known to exclude them.

72. Mr. Watkin Williams: It was not his inability to take the oath, but his inability to pledge himself to the truth of what he was asked to swear to? – Certainly.

73. Mr. Staveley Hill: I gather from you that the House never asked O’Connell to take the oath after his giving the grounds of recusancy? – Yes, that is so.

74. Mr. Serjeant Simon: It appears that the Speaker first asked him whether he would take the Oath of Supremacy, and then he says, No, and gives those reasons? – Yes.

75. Mr. Pemberton: In addition to Mr. O’Connell’s having been heard after he had at first declined to take the oath, was there not some further discussion in the House in which other Members took part? – Certainly; those Debates will all be found in Hansard.

76. Sir Gabriel Goldney: His refusal to take the oath in the first instance was accompanied by a claim at the same time to take the new oath? – Clearly.

77. It was a refusal to take the oath accompanied by a claim for a new one; afterwards he was allowed to be heard upon that point, and then it was that the House, having decided that he could not be admitted on the new oath, he was asked if he chose to take the old oath, which he refused to do? – That is a correct statement of the case.

78. Mr. Hopwood: With regard to the point of the Standing Orders as to which Mr. Bradlaugh has asked, as I understand you, under the old practice, as pointed out in Hatsell, and as we know it existed, the occasion of a Member coming to be sworn caused all other business to cease? – Yes.

79. And then as you say, a Standing Order was passed that particular times more appropriate should be allotted for taking those oaths? – Yes.

80. But even though that may be so at the time of taking an oath, no other business can go on? – Clearly not; it is the sole business that is transacted at the moment.

81. No other business can be interposed, and nothing else can be proceeded with but the oath of the Member? – Certainly not; it is the business of the moment, and no other business can interpose.

82. Mr. Gibson: You have been asked by several honorable Members about O’Connell’s case; in your opinion, is there the slightest analogy between the facts and circumstances in O’Connell’s case and those of the case now before the Committee? – I see none myself, but I would rather leave such questions for the determination of the Committee. I have stated the case in print, and of course the points of difference are matters of argument.

83. So far as you know, is there any precedent for permitting a Member of the House of Commons to take the Oath after he has stated in the House expressly, or by necessary implication, that it will have no binding effect upon his conscience? – There is no such case on record, so far as I have had the means of ascertaining.

Mr. Charles Bradlaugh, a Member of the House; Examined:

84. Chairman: You were in the room, I think, when Sir Thomas Erskine May gave that part of his evidence as to a matter which was not on the Votes and Proceedings? – Yes, but which took place upon the occasion of my first coming to offer to affirm.

85. Is that accurately and fully stated? – It is accurately and fully stated. I shall have to ask the indulgence of the Committee if in any of the points which I press there seems to be any undueness in the pressing of them, because, as far as I can see, this is the first occasion on which such a matter has arisen. In the reference which the Committee have to deal with, I claim to be sworn and take my seat by virtue of my due return, a return untainted by illegality of any description, and in pursuance of the Statute of the 5th of Richard II., which puts upon me the duty of coming here to be sworn and do my duty under penalty of fine and imprisonment. I do not know whether the Committee wish that I should read the Statute. It is the second Statute of Richard II.; it is on page 228 of the revised Statutes, Vol. I.; it is a Statute of the year 1382. I submit that although a Member may not sit and vote until he has taken the oaths, he is entitled to all the other privileges of a Member, and is otherwise regarded both by the House and the laws as qualified to serve, until some other disqualification has been shown to exist; and I quote in support of that Sir Thomas Erskine May’s book, p. 202, that there is nothing in what I did in asking to affirm which in any way disqualified me from taking the Oath. The evidence that that is so is found in the case of Archdale, on page 3 of the Precedents handed in by Sir Thomas Erskine May, where, after John Archdale had claimed to affirm, he was called into the House, and Mr. Speaker, by direction of the House, asked him if he would take the oaths; that I have never at any time refused to take the Oath of Allegiance provided by Statute to be taken by Members; that all I did was, believing as I then did, that I had the right to affirm, to claim to affirm, and I was then absolutely silent as to the oath; that I did not refuse to take it, nor have I then or since expressed any mental reservation, or stated that the appointed Oath of Allegiance would not be binding upon me; that, on the contrary, I say, and have said, that the essential part of the oath is in the fullest and most complete degree binding upon my honor and conscience, and that the repeating of words of asseveration does not in the slightest degree weaken the binding effect of the Oath of Allegiance upon me. I may say, that if it would be more convenient for any Member of the Committee to ask me any question upon my statement as I go on, it will not interrupt me at all.